At Sāvatthī.
"Bhikkhus, those ascetics and brahmins who recollect their manifold past abodes all recollect the five aggregates subject to clinging or a certain one among them.Spk says that this does not refer to recollection by direct knowledge (i.e., by retrocognition of the past) but to the recollection of one's past abodes by way of insight. Spk seems to understand the purport of the Buddha's statement to be that they deliberately recollect the past in terms of the aggregates. I take the point differently, i.e., that though these ascetics imagine they are recalling the past experience of a permanent self, they are only recollecting past configurations of the five aggregates. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the next paragraph, which reduces first-person memories (evaṃrūpo ahosiṃ) to experiences frames solely in terms of the aggregates (rūpaṃ yeva). It can also draw support from the parallel paragraph opening SN22.47. Spk entitles this passage "the emptiness section" (suññatāpabba). A parallel commentary on the passage, slightly more elaborate, is at Vibh-a 3-6.
What five?
"When recollecting thus, bhikkhus: 'I had such form in the past,' it is just form that one recollects.
When recollecting: 'I had such a feeling in the past,' it is just feeling that one recollects.
When recollecting: 'I had such a perceptionin the past,' it is just perceptionthat one recollects. When recollecting: 'I had such volitional formations in the past,' it is just volitional formations that one recollects. When recollecting: 'I had such consciousness in the past,' it is just consciousness that one recollects.
"And why, bhikkhus, do you call it form?Spk: Even though emptiness has been discussed, the discussion is not yet definitive because the characteristic of emptiness (suññatālakkhaṇa) has not been discussed. The present passage is introduced to show the characteristic of emptiness. Spk-pṭ: Since form, etc., are neither a self nor the belongings of a self, but are insubstantial and ownerless, they are empty of that (self). Their nature is emptiness, their characteristic is "being deformed," etc.
'It is deformed,' bhikkhus, therefore it is called form.I have tried, though clumsily, to capture the subtle word play of the Pāli, which capitalizes on the apparent correspondence between the verb ruppati and the noun rūpa. Etymologically, the two are not related. Ruppati is a passive verb from the root rup (=Skt lup), "to break, injure, spoil." MW lists rupyate (s.v. rup), "to suffer violent or racking pain." See too PED, s.v. ruppati. Spk glosses: Ruppatīti kuppati ghaṭṭīyati pīḷīyati, bhijjatīti attho; "It is deformed: it is disturbed, stricken, oppressed, meaning 'it is broken.'" At KS 2:73, n.1, Woodward has misunderstood the point of the commentary. It is not the case that Buddhaghose misconstrues "these various contacts not as referring to this life, but as 'informing' creatures in other spheres." Rather, he merely cites the cold hells, hot hells, etc., as the realms where the different types of "deformation" are most evident (pākaṭa). Spk adds that being "deformed" is the specific characteristic (paccattalakkhaṇa) of form, which distinguishes it from feeling and the other aggregates; but the general characteristics (samaññalakkhaṇa) are what they have in common, namely, impermanence, suffering, and nonself.
Deformed by what?
Deformed by cold, deformed by heat, deformed by hunger, deformed by thirst, deformed by contact with flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, and serpents.
'It is deformed,' bhikkhus, therefore it is called form.
"And why, bhikkhus, do you call it feeling?
'It feels,' bhikkhus, therefore it is called feeling.It is feeling itself that feels, not another - a being or a person.
And what does it feel?
It feels pleasure, it feels pain, it feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure.
'it feels,' bhikkhus, therefore it is called feeling.
"And why, bhikkhus, do you call it perception?
'It perceives,' bhikkhus, therefore it is called perception.
And what does it perceive?
It perceives blue, it perceives yellow, it perceives red, it perceives white.
'It perceives,' bhikkhus, therefore it is called perception.
"And why, bhikkhus, do you call them volitional formations?
They construct the conditioned,' bhikkhus, therefore they are called volitional formations.Unfortunately English is a poor medium for capturing the interconnections of this sentence in Pāli, with the object (saṅkhataṃ), the verb (abhisaṅkharonti) and the subject (saṅkhārā) all derived from the same stem. See my discussion of saṅkhārā in the General Introduction, pp. 44-47. To replicate the Pāli we might have rendered it, "They construct the constructed, therefore they are called volitional constructions," though this would bear certain connotations quite alien to the original. It is also an unfortunate coincidence that "volitional formations," my rendering for saṅkhārā, is related to "form", my rendering for rūpa. In Pāli there is no etymological tie between rūpa and saṅkhārā. To capture the several nuances of the verb abhisaṅkharoti we might have taken the liberty of rendering it, in this passage, by two verbs: "to generate," which conveys the idea that the volitional formations actually produce the other aggregates (see the following note); and "to form," Which makes apparent the correspondence with the noun "formations." This passage shows the active role of cetanā, volition, in constructing experienced reality. Not only does volition influence the objective content of the experience, but it also shapes the psychophysical organism within which it has arisen and, via its role as kamma, shapes the future configurations of the five aggregates to be produced by kamma. In this connection see SN35.146, on the six sense bases as "old kamma."
And what is the conditioned that they construct?
They construct conditioned form as form;All three printed eds. of SN read, rūpaṃ rūpattāya saṅkhataṃ abhisaṅkharonti, and so for the other aggregates, except viññāṇa, where Ee reads, viññāṇatthāya; however, since Ee has no note on vv.ll., this is almost certainly an editorial inconsistency rather than a meaningful variant. Spk (Se and Ee) reads rūpatthāya in its lemma, implying that the termination -atthāya should apply to every aggregate, and apparently old Sinhalese mss of SN had this reading. Spk (Be), however, has rūpattāya. The explanation in Spk is equally intelligible on either reading of SN. I follow Be here: "As one is said to cook conjee as conjee, to bake a cake as a cake, so it [Spk-pṭ: the collection of states headed by volition] constructs, builds up, amasses (abhisaṅkharoti āyūhati sampiṇḍati) form itself - called 'the conditioned' because it is made by a combination of conditions - so that it becomes 'conditioned form' in accordance with its nature, for its formness (tathattāya rūpabhāvāya); the meaning is that it produces it (nipphādetīti attho). This is the sense in brief: It constructs, produces the form arising along with itself and the associated feeling, etc. Here, too, the Blessed One shows just the specific characteristic of volitional formations, whose characteristic is volition. {spk-pṭ: This is said because volition is the chief of the states belonging to the aggregate of volitional formations.]" they construct conditioned feeling as feeling; they construct conditioned perception as perception; they construct conditioned volitional formations as volitional formations; they construct conditioned consciousness as consciousness.
'They construct the conditioned,' bhikkhus, therefore they are called volitional formations.
"And why, bhikkhus, do you call it consciousness?
'It cognizes,' bhikkhus, therefore it is called consciousness.
And what does it cognize?
It cognizes sour, it cognizes bitter, it cognizes pungent, it cognizes sweet, it cognizes sharp, it cognizes mild, it cognizes salty, it cognizes bland.
'It cognizes,' bhikkhus, therefore it is called consciousness.The eight flavours are: ambila, tittaka, kaṭuka, madhuka, khārika, akhārika, loṇaka, aloṇaka; see too SN 47.8. The explanation of viññāṇa here is very similar to that of saññā, the difference being only in the type of sense object they cognize. Spk explains that the difference in object highlights a difference in their cognitive functions: "Perception is analysed by way of the eye door because it is evident in grasping the appearance and shape of object; consciousness is analysed by way of tongue door because it can grasp particular distinctions in an object even when there is no appearance and shape." Spk continues with an explanation (also found at Vism 437; Ppn 14:3-5) according to which saññā, viññāṇa, and paññā are cognitive functions of increasing depth, discriminative acumen, and power of comprehension; this, however, is difficult to reconcile with the account of these factors found in the Nikāyas. Usually in the suttas viññāṇa is presented simply as the basic awareness of an object through one of the sense bases, i.e., as bare "consciousness of" rather than as a discriminative capacity. A parallel treatment of viññāṇa at MN I 292,26-29 defines it through its ability to cognize the three types of feelings (pleasant, painful, neutral); this just shifts the problem to that of distinguishing between viññāṇa and vedanā. Hamilton discusses the problem posed by these passages (Identity and Experience, pp. 53-55, 92-93). She offers the helpful suggestion that although viññāṇa is here defined in a way that encroaches upon the domain of saññā, we should understand that saññā does the actual discrimination (of objects at all five senses) while viññāṇa "is the awareness by which we experience every stage of the cognitive process, including the process of discriminating" (p.92). From the commentarial standpoint, saññā is discussed more fully at As 110-11 and viññāṇa (under the name citta) at As 63-64.