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Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīṭīkā
Abhidhammatthavibhāvinīṭīkā

Pañcadvāravīthivaṇṇanā

Author: PTS @ IAPT

How? He asks in what manner objects are determined as "very great", etc., and in order to make this clear by referring to consciousness-moments he begins with the words, arising, presence.
Arising is the event of arising, the taking of the opportunity;
dissolution is dissolving, the destruction of its own appearance.
Between these two, facing towards dissolution, is presence.
Some, however, deny that consciousness has a presence-moment.Ānanda in the mūlaṭīkā; see Vibh-mṭ (Be) 22-3, Abhidh-av-nṭ (Be) II 183-4; cf. Karunadasa, Buddhist Analysis of Matter, p. 88; Bodhi, Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, pp. 156-57.
Their reasoning is as follows. In the section on consciousness in the Yamaka it is stated that 'what is arising has arisen';Yam II 18 in the analysis of this statement it is stated: 'At the moment of dissolution, a thing has arisen, but is not arising; at the moment of arising, it has both arisen and is arising.'Ibid. Thus dissolution and arising are clearly stated, but not the moment of presence.
But if there were a moment of presence for consciousness, then it should have been stated [in the quoted passage] as occurring at the moment of dissolution.
So they consider that the moment of presence exists in accordance with the Suttanta text that states: 'Arising is known (paññāyati), ceasing is known, the change of what is present is known.'S III 38; A I 152; Paṭis II 108; Kv 60-61. In this passage also, since there is no occurrence of change in one particular dhamma and because of the use of the expression 'is known', it is presence as continuity that is meant and not presence as a moment. And there is no reason for something that is found not to be mentioned in the Abhidhamma. Therefore as it is not mentioned in the tradition of the Dhamma this shows it does not exist.
On this question it should be said [in reply] that since, in the arising and dissolution of the underlying condition of a particular dhamma, the moment of arising is one moment, the moment of ceasing another, a phase of dissolution that is distinct from the phase of arising is required, for otherwise one would be committed to the position that one dhamma is arising while another is ceasing.
In this way a phase facing dissolution that is distinct from the phases of arising and dissolution is required. This phase is called 'presence'.
However, in the canonical texts the moment of presence is not mentioned by reason of wise reflection out of consideration for the disposition of those receiving the teaching,

although in fact in consideration for the disposition of those receiving the teaching in some places the Abhidhamma teaching does occur, as when it is taught that the arising of materiality is to be distinguished as twofold as accumulation and continuity.Dhs 144 (§642); cf. below Chapter VI, §16.

As for the Sutta text:

Monks, these three characteristics of the conditioned belong to the conditioned.

Which three?

Arising is known, ceasing is known, the alteration of what is present is known.

Since arising, etc, are spoken of here in order to indicate the characteristics of conditioned dhammas, it is not possible to consider that what is spoken of here is the presence of continuity, which is by nature a concept and something unconditioned.

And since the prefix in the word paññāyati occurs in the same meaning as the root, the meaning is 'is perceived' (viññāyati).
Therefore there is not sufficient reason to reject the presence moment of consciousness, and it is correct to say, 'By way of arising, presence, and dissolution.'
In consideration of this, it is said in the [Abhidhamma] Commentary too, 'By way of arising, presence, and dissolution, all consciousnesses have three moments.'Vibh-a 27
Immaterial things change fast, material things change slowly, each being produced momentarily in their [respective] conditions as that which apprehends and that which is apprehended, and so he states the words beginning, These.
These: of the same kind as these.
Seventeen-consciousness-moments are moments that are equivalent to the moments of seventeen consciousnesses, or they are seventeen consciousness-moments; this is the construction.
But taken separately there are fifty-one consciousness moments.Seventeen multiplied by the three moments of arising, presence and dissolution.
Of material dhammas: of material dhammas other than the kinds of communication and the characteristic [phases].
For the two kinds of communication last for one consciousness-moment.
and are therefore mentioned among the dhammas whose occurrence coincides with consciousness;
and of the characteristic [phases], birth and impermanence have the same duration as the moments of arising and dissolution of consciousness, while decay lasts for forty-nine consciousness-moments.
In consideration of this they say:
Except for communication and the characteristic [phases], it lasts for seventeen consciousnesses.Sacc 60
Because of the statement in the [Abhidhamma] Commentary on dependent arising, 'so far eleven consciousness-moments have passed, there are five consciousness-moments remaining,'Vibh-a 157; Vism 549 (Chapter VII, §137) some say that material dhammas last for only sixteen consciousness-moments;

they argue that the mere arising of materiality is the condition for the vibrating of the existence-continuum. But his [argument] lacks substance. That [material dhammas] last for seventeen consciousness-moments has come down in the [Abhidhamma] Commentary itself:

Materiality that has arisen along with the relinking consciousness ceases with the seventeenth [moment of consciousness] after that; materiality that has arisen at the presence-moment of the relinking consciousness ceases at the arising-moment of the eighteenth...Vibh-a 28.

Where only sixteen consciousness-moments are declared, the method employed is with reference to the moment that is capable of acting as the condition for the activity of consciousness.
For it is enough to explain that for materiality to be capable of coming into the range [of consciousness] it must have been there for at least one consciousness-moment.
One consciousness-moment is a moment that is like the moment of one consciousness; one-consciousness-moment-passed means that for these [five kinds of object] this has passed, or that they have passed this.
Comes into range: visible objects and sound-objects, each positioned in its own place, enter the objective field; in the form of several clusters they come into range in a manner appropriate for enjoyment. But each of the remaining [kinds of object] comes into range in the form of individual [material] clusters which become attached to the [material] supports consisting of the nose, etc., as the causes for the activity of perception,
while, in the form of individual clusters, the sensitive organs also become the underlying supports for the activity of perception. The latter arise with the existence-continuum that acts as contiguity-condition for the vibrating existence-continuum;
others say that they arise with adverting.
When the existence-continuum has vibrated twice: when, taking its object which has been previously apprehended, the existence-continuum has occurred twice by way of the vibrating of existence-continuum, which is reckoned the cause for the act of perceiving something different.
For when there is impact with the object by virtue of its being positioned in a place that is suitable for the five sense organs, the sequence of existence-continua gets interrupted by the experience of that impact on the sense organs, [though] it is not interrupted suddenly. As when a man who is running fast wants to stop, stops only after he has taken one or two further steps, so it is interrupted only after it has occurred twice.
The first of these consciousness is 'the vibration of the existence-continuum' since its arising causes the sequence of existence-continua to vibrate; the second they call 'the interruption of the existence-continuum' because its arising is the cause of its being interrupted.
Here, however, 'when the existence-continuum has vibrated twice' is stated without making any distinction [between these two].
But surely, when visible forms, etc., make impact with the sense organs it is only vibration of what is supported by those [sense organs] that makes sense, so how is there vibrating of the existence continuum which is supported by the heart-base?
Because of [their] being bound together as a continuity.
For when a fly has alighted on a grain of sugar on one surface of a drum, and the other surface is struck with a stick or whatever, the sugar is made to vibrate by the vibration in turn of the drum's skin and cords, etc., and the fly flies off and goes. Similarly when visible form, etc., makes impact with the sense organs, the essential elements, which are their supports, are vibrated, and as a result of the successive vibrating of the other material elements that are bound up with them the heart-base is vibrated, and the vibrating of the existence-continuum that is supported by that causes activity to occur.
It is said:
One should illustrate by the simile of the grain of sugar how, when one base is struck, there is disturbance of what is supported by some other [base] by reason of their being bound together.Sacc 176
[see above]
The stream of existence-continuum : the flow of existence-continuum.
Adverting: turning around as if to ask, 'Now what is this?'
Seeing: beholding directly.
But, since it is said that 'one sees visible forms with the eye'Vibh 248 is it not the eye-faculty itself that performs the function of seeing, and not consciousness?
Not so. Materiality, being blind, has no capacity to see the visible form.
And if it were the eye-faculty that saw visible form, then it would also be possible for someone experiencing a consciousness other [than eye-consciousness] to see visible form.
Yet if one attributes the function [of seeing] to consciousness, then, since consciousness has no obstacles, one would see concealed visible objects.A note here in Ee refers to Maṇisāramañhusā (= Abhidh-s-anu-ṭ), vīthisaṅgahavaṇṇanā.
One can allow the seeing of something concealed when it is placed behind crystal, etc., and there is no obstacle to light, but when it is something concealed by a wall, etc., there is an obstacle to light,
and in the absence of this condition consciousness does not arise and eye-consciousness does not apprehend the object.
But in the above quotation 'by the eye' means 'by the eye-door which is the means [of seeing]'.
Alternatively, the supported activity is referred to as something bound up with its support, as in the expression 'the beds make a noise'.Cf. Chapter I, §3
Receiving : as if accepting that same visible form.
Investigating : as if examining that same visible form.
Determining : as if carefully noting that same visible form.
Whichever of the ... impulsions has obtained the right causal conditions -- has obtained the conditions of clear bringing-to-mind, etc.; this is the construction.
[see above]
As there are only five or six impulsions when one is semi-consciousness or close to death, he says usually.
Following after impulsion : they go along with impulsion for some time, like the current of a river [going along] with a boat that is moving upstream.
Retaining-the-object (tadārammaṇa) means that the object of impulsion is their object, by virtue of the dropping out of the middle word, as in such expressions as 'one whose voice is Brahmā's [voice]' (brahmassara);A particular kind of explanation of a bahuvrīhi compound: retention or 'having the object of that' (tad-ārammaṇa) is 'something whose object is impulsion's object', just as 'having the voice of Brahmā' (brahmassara) is 'someone whose voice is the voice of Brahmā', although the word object/voice only occurs once in each expression. resultants retaining the object(tadārammaṇa-pāka) means that they are both retentions and resultants.
As appropriate : appropriate to the object, impulsions and living being;

but he himself will explain its occurrence thus [later].

Lapse into existence-continuum : he states that the appearance of consciousness as existence-continuum is like its lapsing into the existence-continuum once it has ceased to be active as process-consciousness.

In order to make it easy to understand the activity of the process consciousnesses they offer various similes like that of the mango. Here is just the mango simile.Cf. Dhs-a 271-4. According to Saddhatissa (Upās 106, 109) Sāriputta's Abhidh-s-sn cites a Sanskrit verse in the sragdharā metre from the Āryasatyāvatāra (a lost, apparently Theravādin, Sanskrit Abhidharma text possibly by Jotipāla): 'A man had gone to sleep at the foot of a mango tree; at the sound of a falling fruit he opened his eyes; he saw the fruit, picked it up, pressed it all around with his hand, and realized it was ripe; attracted by the thought of the taste he ate it, and having enjoyed the final flavour that lingered in his mouth with the saliva, he went to sleep. (suptaś cūtasya mūle phala-patana-ravāt kaś cid unmīlya cakṣur // dṛṣṭvād cādāya caitat phalam atha paritaḥ# pīḍayitvā kareṇa // jñatvā pakva-svabhāvaṃ kila paribubhuje tad rasākṛṣṭa-cetāḥ // paścāt tālvādi-lagnaṃ rasam api ca saha śleṣmaṇāsvādya śiśye //); #Saddhatissa reads paritā.

A man is sleeping under a mango tree that is in fruit with his head covered. At the sound of a single mango falling close by he wakes up; he removes the cloth from his head, opens his eyes, and sees it; taking hold of it, he presses it, smells it, realizes that it is ripe, eats it, and swallowing the saliva with what is left in his mouth goes back to sleep in the same place.

Herein the occurrence of the existence-continuum is like the time when the man is sleeping; when the object makes impact with the sense organ it is like the moment when the fruit has fallen; the occurrence of adverting is like the time when he wakes up at the sound; the occurrence of eye-consciousness's activity is like the time when, opening his eyes, he looks down; the occurrence of receiving is like the time when he takes hold [of the mango]; the occurrence of investigating is like the time when he presses it; the occurrence of determining is like the time when he smells it; the occurrence of impulsion is like the time when he is eating it; the occurrence of retention is like the time when he is swallowing what is left in his mouth with the saliva; the occurrence of the existence-continuum is like the time when he is once more sleeping.
What does this simile show?
That the function of the object is just to make impact with the sense organ; that of adverting is just to direct [the mind] towards the objective field; that of eye-consciousness is merely seeing; and those of receiving, etc., are merely accepting, etc.; but it is the function of impulsion alone to enjoy the taste of the object, while that of retention is enjoying just what has been enjoyed by that [impulsion]. In this way it is shown how each of these dhammas has a distinct function,
and thus one should understand that when consciousness, like the fixed order of the seasons and seeds, without there being anyone issuing orders saying, 'You are adverting and come immediately after existence-continuum; you are, say, seeing, or whatever, and come immediately after adverting.'
The construction is: up to this point seventeen consciousness moments have been completed.
Past and is not capable of lasting: being past, it is not capable of lasting.
There is no arising of retention: Because the object ceases to exist when [the consciousness process] has lasted fourteen consciousness moments, retention does not appear,
for past objects are not mixed with present objects in the same consciousness process.
In cases where [the consciousness process] lasts fifteen consciousness moments, there is only one consciousness moment remaining after the arising of the impulsions; since it is not possible for retention to arise twice,, the second retention cannot arise, and so the first also does not arise.
For the fixed rule in the texts is only the arising of retention twice, since the tradition is that two occurrences of consciousness in the enumeration of all occurrences in the activity of consciousness means 'two retentions'.
However, when it is said in the Paramatthavinicchaya:

"Retention occurs once or twice, adverting, etc., once.Pm-vn 116

it is said following the opinion of the reciters of the Majjhima Nikāya,

but the view of the reciters of the Majjhima Nikāya is rejected in the Sammohavinodanī as not agreeing with the texts mentioned above, therefore, since it is not what he himself accepts, Ācariya Anuruddha does not mention the single occurrence of retention here or in the Nāmarūpapariccheda.Vibh-a 153; cf. Vism 547 (Chapter XVII, §129). The fact that Paramatthavinicchaya does mention one moment of retention would seem to suggest, despite the traditional attribution, a different author from that of Abhidh-s and Nāmar-p. Cf. Buddhadatta, JPTS X (1985), p. 158; von Hinuber, Handbook of Pāli Literature, p. 163 (§350).
An object that only has a duration of six consciousness moments remaining after the arising of determining, being very weak because it is short-lived, cannot act as the condition for the arising of impulsion.
For it is a rule that when impulsion arises, it does so only when [the object] has a duration of seven consciousness moments [remaining];
The suffix -tvā is to show the cause; the meaning is 'because of the non-arising of the impulsion',
for otherwise the subsequent verb does not have the same agent.The commentator appears to be suggesting that anuppajjitvā should be taken as an ablative rather than an absolutive.
Two or three times: either two times or three times.
Although some suggest that 'three times' is said here merely to make the text read well. But this is merely their opinion.
For if he had said 'determining alone occurs twice' the text would not have read badly. And nothing that is said in the commentaries rules out determining's occurring three times.
And in consideration of this, the authors of the Sinhala commentaries explain in various places that it occurs two or three times.
Determining alone occurs: determining alone arises repeatedly.
If it did not occur, the activity of consciousness would not continue but would get stuck with eye-consciousness, etc.
Ācariya Ānanda points outDhs-mṭ (Be) 130 here that it follows from the statement that adverting, by way of contiguity condition, is a condition for wholesome and unwholesome aggregates,Tikap 159; Paṭṭh (Be) I 138. that adverting is stated as the contiguity condition for wholesome and unwholesome [dhammas]; and so, since no distinction in meaning is made [in the Paṭṭhāna?] between determining and adverting, when adverting arises it ought to arise exclusively by way of contiguity condition for wholesome, unwholesome, and kiriya impulsions, and in no other circumstances; [it follows that] the slight object should be defined in terms of incomplete impulsionsReading with Ce 1898, Be 1986, Se 1922, javanāpāripūriyā. due to the weak force at times of semi-consciousness, etc., and not in terms of the occurrence of determining two or three times.
Although he points this out, yet resultants with three motivations, which are explicitly mentioned as acting as contiguity condition,Dukap 45.
when they occur as decease for those who have destroyed the taints, do not act as the contiguity condition for anything. So, as in this [latter] case, it is not possible to say on the grounds of the restriction of conditions [in the Paṭṭhāna] that determining is not the contiguity condition for wholesome, unwholesome, and other [dhammas]. Therefore the slight object is defined here [in the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha] exactly according to the method that has come down in the commentaries.
There is no arising of the process consciousness: since [an object] that will last at most seven consciousness-moments is not capable of sustaining the arising of determining two or three times, there is no arising of the process-consciousnesses, but only the lapsing into existence-continuum; this is the meaning.
he states that there is no arising of the process-consciousnesses in order to indicate that the full extent of the effect is only the vibrating of the existence-continuum.
But others indicate that the full extent of the effect is that the existence-continuum is not interrupted. But that is already implied by the statement that there is no arising of the process-consciousnesses,
for when the process consciousnesses arise the existence-continuum is interrupted.
But since there has been no separate mention of the term 'interruption of the existence-continuum' above, he speaks without specifying [it] here.
Because the arising of the process-consciousnesses is entirely absent, here only the last course is said to be futile, but elsewhere, as they lack retention and impulsion, the second and the third are also said to be 'futile'.As 269-70
Constituting objects (ārammaṇabhūta): constituting an object [of perception] (visaya) and constituting a condition (paccaya).
For a condition is also called an object in such expressions as 'Māra finds an opportunity, Māra finds an object (ārammaṇa)'.D III 58, etc.
It is precisely for this reason that it is established that the presentation of an object [of perception] constitutes an object (ārammaṇa) in the case of the futile course,
for the very slight object is the condition for recognizing a futile course.
Otherwise, if there were no presentation at all in the case of the very slight object of the futile course in the form of the vibrating of the existence-continuum in response to the different objective fields, it would be difficult to explain how [the presentation of objects] constitutes four courses.
Arising as appropriate at the five doors in accordance with the various doors, various conditions, various objects, there are uniformly just seven process-consciousnesses by way of adverting, seeing, etc., receiving, investigating, determining, impulsion, and retention;
the arisings of the consciousness -- from the point of view of the separate arising of consciousnesses, or simply consciousnesses arising -- are fourteen by way of the five beginning with adverting, seven impulsions and two retentions;
in full they are fifty-four, since all sense-sphere consciousnesses arise according to circumstances [at the five doors].
Here: in this summary of the presentation of objects.
[End of the explanation of the process at the five sense-doors.]