2.23. 'There are, monks, some ascetics and Brahmins who
are eel-wrigglers.Amarā-vikheppika can be interpreted as either 'eel-
wriggling'(RD) or 'endless equivocation'(BB): amarā
(lit.'deathless') is the name of a slippery fish, perhaps
an eel, which escapes capture by wriggling (DA). A
deliberate pun may well be intended. When asked about this or that matter,
they resort to evasive statements, and they wriggle like eels on
four grounds.
What are they?
2.24. [Wrong view 13] 'In this case there is an ascetic or
Brahmin who does not in truth know whether a thing is good or bad.
He thinks:
"I do not in truth know whether this is
good or whether it is bad.
Not knowing which is right, I
might declare: 'That is good', or 'That is bad', and that might
be a lie,
and that would distress me.
And if I were distressed,
that would be a hindrance to me."Either for the higher training or for a heavenly rebirth
(DA). Cf. verse 1.5, where the former is certainly meant.
Thus fearing to lie, abhorring to lieDue to moral shame and moral dread (hinottappa)
(DA), i.e. shame at doing what is wrong, and dread of
it. These two qualities are called 'guardians of the
world'(cf. Nyanaponika Thera, Abhidhamma Studies,
2nd. ed., Colombo 1g65, p. 8o). Thus it is recognised
that the first three classes of 'eel-wrigglers' have a moral
conscience. Their equivocation stems from lack of
understanding, not of scruple. he does not declare a thing to be good or bad,
but when asked about this or that matter, he resorts to evasive
statements and wriggles like an eel:
"I don't say this,
I don't
say that.
I don't say it is otherwise.
I don't say it is not.
I don't
not say it is not."
This is the first case.
2.25. [Wrong view 14] 'What is the second way?
Here an
ascetic or Brahmin does not in truth know whether a thing is
good or bad.
He thinks:
...
"I might declare: 'That is good', or
'That is bad', and I might feel desire or lust or hatred or aversion.
If I felt desire, lust, hatred or aversion, that would be
attachment on my part.
If I felt attachment, that would distress
me,
and if I were distressed, that would be a hindrance to
me."
Thus, fearing attachment, abhorring attachment, he
resorts to evasive statements. . .
...
...
...
...
...
This is the second case.
2.26. [Wrong view 15] 'What is the third way?
Here an ascetic or Brahmin does not in truth know whether a thing is good
or bad.
He thinks:
...
..."I might declare: 'That is good', or 'That is
bad',
but there are ascetics and Brahmins who are wise, skilful, practised debaters, like archers who can split hairs, who
go around destroying others' views with their wisdom, and
they might cross-examine me, demanding my reasons and
arguing.
And I might not be able to reply.
Not being able to reply would distress me,
and if I were distressed, that would
be a hindrance to me."
Thus, fearing debate, abhorring debate, he resorts to evasive statements.
...
...
...
...
...
This is the third case.
2.27. [Wrong view 16] 'What is the fourth way?
Here, an
ascetic or Brahmin is dull and stupid.The following views are attributed in DN 2.3if. to San-
jaya (see n.13). Because of his dullness
and stupidity,
when he is questioned he resorts to evasive
statements and wriggles like an eel:
"If you ask me whether
there is another world - if I thought so, I would say there is
another world. But I don't say so. And I don't say otherwise.
And I don't say it is not, and I don't not say it is not."
"Is
there no other world?. . . " "Is there both another world and no
other world?. . . " "Is there neither another world nor no other
world?. . . "The four 'alternatives' of Indian logic: a thing(a) is,(b)
is not,(c) both is and is not,(d) neither is nor is not. "Are there spontaneously-born beings?. . .See n.185.
"Are there not. . . ?" "Both. . . ?" "Neither. . . ?" "Does the Tathagata exist after death? Does he not exist after death? Does he
both exist and not exist after death? Does he neither exist nor
not exist after death?. . . "See also DN 9.25 and n.219. "If I thought so, I would say so. . .I
don't say it is not."
This is the fourth case.
2.28. 'These are the four ways in which those ascetics
and Brahmins who are Eel-Wrigglers resort to evasive statements. . .
...There is no other way. 2.29. 'This, monks, the Tathagata understands: These viewpoints thus grasped and adhered to will lead to such-and-such
destinations in another world. . . (as verse 15).
'These, monks, are those other matters, profound, hard to
see. . .which the TathSgata, having realised them by his own
super-knowledge, proclaims, and about which those who
would truthfully praise the Tathagata would rightly speak.